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SHOULD INVESTMENT COMPANIES BE 
SUBJECT TO A NEW STATUTORY SELF-
REGULATORY ORGANIZATION? 
JOEL SELIGMAN* 
I. BACKGROUND 
Four developments have focused attention on whether investment 
companies registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC” or “Commission”) under the Investment Company Act of 19401 
(“The Investment Company Act”) should be subject to a new statutory 
self-regulatory organization (“SRO”).2 
First, the SEC has periodically proven inadequate to inspect and 
discipline investment companies. This is both a matter of resources and 
priorities. In 2003, for example, there were 8126 mutual funds with total 
assets of $7.414 trillion.3 SEC inspection of investment companies has 
long been astonishingly infrequent. According to the GAO, before 1998, 
each mutual fund was inspected an average of once every twelve to 
twenty-four years.4 The problem is not one merely of resources. 
Investment companies typically hold portfolios of securities that diversify 
firm-specific risk. In part because of this, investment companies have 
rarely been an enforcement priority for the SEC. 
Second, the perennially inadequate SEC oversight was followed by a 
significant number of mutual fund trading or sales practice scandals, 
beginning in 2003.5 Much attention has focused on late trading6 and 
 * President, University of Rochester; Dean and Ethan A. H. Shepley Professor, Washington 
University in St. Louis (1999–2005); in January 2004 the author was elected to the NASD Board of 
Governors. Let me thank Robert Glauber, Chairman and CEO, NASD, and Mary Schapiro, Chairman- 
and CEO-elect, NASD, for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (2000). 
 2. Elsewhere I have reviewed stock market self-regulation. See Joel Seligman, Cautious 
Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-Regulation During the First Seventy Years of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 BUS. LAW. 1347 (2004). 
 3. Inv. Co. Inst., Mutual Fund Fact Book at 1, 13 (2003). 
 4. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC OPERATIONS: OVERSIGHT OF MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 
PRESENTS MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 4 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04584t.pdf 
(testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives). 
 5. See generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 116–24 (3d ed. 
Supp. 2005). 
 6. In 2003, Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General, settled New York v. Canary Capital 
Partners, LLC, in which a hedge fund agreed to pay $40 million after civil allegations were filed 
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market timing,7 but the problems are broader, involving other areas such 
as variable products,8 the independence of mutual fund governance,9 soft 
dollars and directed brokerage,10 volume discount breakpoints,11 portfolio 
alleging an unlawful trading scheme involving several leading mutual funds. N.Y. A.G. Launches 
Probe of Fund Industry; Hedge Fund Pays $40M to Resolve Claims, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
1505 (Sept. 15, 2003). See also Steven B. Markovitz, Securities Act Release No. 8298, Exchange Act 
Release No. 48,588, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,201, 81 SEC Docket 450 (Oct. 2, 2003) 
(SEC consent settlement with Millennium Partners, L.P. hedge fund trader who engaged in late 
trading); SEC v. PIMCO Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (pretrial 
motions to dismiss denied in part and granted in part in SEC cases under Investment Company Act 
against mutual fund executives for market timing). 
 7. Chairman Donaldson testified to a House hearing in late October 2003 that market timing 
and late trading abuses by mutual funds were “quite widespread . . . more widespread than we 
originally anticipated.” Donaldson Says Improper Trading in Mutual Funds “Quite Widespread,” 35 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1806 (Nov. 3, 2003). 
 In March 2004 the Commission settled the largest market timing and late trading case to that date 
with Bank of America and two FleetBoston Financial Corporation subsidiaries. The settlement 
aggregated $675 million in a combination of disgorgement and civil penalties. BOA, FleetBoston 
Agree on $675 Million to Resolve SEC, N.Y. Charges over Abuses, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 513 
(Mar. 22, 2004). See also Putnam to Pay $110M to Resolve Charges Its Employees Engaged in Market 
Timing, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 663 (Apr. 12, 2004). 
 8. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, JOINT SEC/NASD REPORT ON EXAMINATION FINDINGS REGARDING BROKER-DEALER 
SALES OF VARIABLE INSURANCE PRODUCTS (2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/secnasdrip.htm; 
Cynthia Glassman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the National Association for 
Variable Annuities (June 14, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch061404cag.htm. In her 
remarks, Commissioner Glassman stated: 
Among other things, the examinations revealed: 
• lack of adequate suitability determinations; 
• lack of adequate written policies and procedures; 
• inadequate supervision and training; 
• lack of adequate disclosure; and 
• deficient books and records. 
Lack of suitability determinations is particularly troublesome. In customer complaints 
received by the Commission and NASD, investors have indicated that they did not understand 
the variable product when it was sold to them, and have expressed concerns that the product 
was not appropriate, or suitable, for them, given their investment objectives. 
Id. 
 9. See, e.g., SEC Looking Closely at Role Played by Independent Directors in Fund Scandal, 36 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 49 (Jan. 12, 2004); SEC Unanimously Proposes Requirements for 
Independent Fund Chair, Supermajority, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 94 (Jan. 19, 2004). 
 10. See, e.g., Paul Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the 
National Association for Variable Annuities (June 14, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch061404pfr.htm. 
 11. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, REPORT OF THE JOINT NASD/INDUSTRY TASK 
FORCE ON BREAKPOINTS (2003). See also UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8377, 
Exchange Act Release No. 49,236, 82 SEC Docket 414 (Feb. 12, 2004) (same); Raymond James Fin. 
Servs., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8374, Exchange Act Release No. 49,234, 82 SEC Docket 409 
(Feb. 12, 2004) (same); Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8368, Exchange 
Act Release No. 49,230, 82 SEC Docket 399 (Feb. 12, 2004) (same); Am. Express Fin. Advisors Inc., 
Securities Act Release No. 8365, Exchange Act Release No. 49,227, 82 SEC Docket 394 (Feb. 12, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/8
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manager conflicts of interest and compensation arrangements,12 and 
revenue sharing with broker-dealers.13 
Third, in 2004, the SEC published a detailed rule proposal and a 
separate Concept Release,14 highlighting the need for more independent 
stock market governance given the systematic weaknesses in the 
effectiveness of stock market SRO regulatory programs, particularly in 
light of the inherent “conflict of interest that exists when an organization 
both serves the commercial interests of and regulates its members or 
users.”15 
To ensure fair administration of stock market SRO governance, the 
Commission proposed a new Rule 6a-5, applicable to national securities 
exchanges, and an identical new Rule 15Aa-3, applicable to registered 
securities associations. The proposals noted: “Among other provisions, the 
proposed rules would require an exchange’s or association’s governing 
board to be composed of a majority of independent directors, with key 
board committees to be composed solely of independent directors.”16 
2004) (cease and desist order and civil order regarding breakpoints); 15 Firms to Pay $21.5M, 
Resolving SEC, NASD Charges over Breakpoints, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 329 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
 12. In 2004, the Commission adopted amendments to Forms N-1A, N-2, N-3, and N-CSR to 
identify portfolio team managers, disclose potential conflicts of interest, and disclose the portfolio 
manager compensation structure and securities ownership. Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers 
of Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8458, Exchange Act 
Release No. 50,227, Investment Company Act Release No. 26, 533, 83 SEC Docket 1802 (Aug. 23, 
2004) (adoption); Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment 
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8396, Exchange Act Release No. 49,398, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,383, 82 SEC Docket 1149 (Mar. 11, 2004) (proposal). 
 13. See, e.g., Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., Securities Act Release No. 8520, Exchange Act 
Release No. 50,910, 84 SEC Docket 1798 (Dec. 22, 2004) (cease and desist order and civil order 
regarding undisclosed revenue sharing arrangements with six mutual fund families and with 
investment representatives who promoted the “preferred families”); Calif. AG Sues Edward D. Jones 
over “Shelf Space” Deals with Funds, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 20 (Jan. 3, 2005); Edward Jones 
to Pay $75M to Avoid Charges in Deferred Compensation Deal, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 7 (Jan. 
3, 2005). 
 14. Exchange Act Release No. 50,699, 84 SEC Docket 444 (Nov. 18, 2004) (rule proposals); 
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 84 SEC Docket 619 
(Nov. 18, 2004). 
 15. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 84 SEC 
Docket 619, 620 (Nov. 18, 2004). 
 16. Exchange Act Release No. 50,699, 84 SEC Docket 444, 455 (Nov. 18, 2004). 
 Following the models of the new NYSE and Nasdaq listing requirements and the recent NYSE 
governance changes, the Commission proposed that each covered exchange and covered association, 
at a minimum, have five Standing Committees of independent directors: Nominating, Governance, 
Compensation, Audit, and Regulatory Oversight. Id. at 463. 
 Each Standing Committee was proposed to have the authority to direct and supervise any matter 
within the scope of its duties and to obtain advice and assistance from independent legal counsel and 
other advisors as it deems necessary. Id. at 464. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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While the SEC did not propose to separate the SRO board chair and 
CEO, it did propose a more far-reaching separation of regulatory and 
market operations. Under proposed Rules 6a-5(n) and 15Aa-3(n), each 
covered securities exchange or covered association would be required to 
establish policies and procedures to assure the independence of its 
regulatory program from its market operations and other commercial 
interests.17 This could either be done by (1) structurally separating market 
operations from market regulation and other commercial interest by means 
of separate legal entities or (2) functional separation within the same legal 
entity.18 In either case, the proposed rules would require that the board 
appoint a Chief Regulatory Officer to administer the regulatory program 
and that the Chief Regulatory Officer report directly to the Regulatory 
Oversight Committee.19 
Fourth, and considerably more far-reaching as a statutory self-
regulatory model, was the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
which addresses public accountant self-regulation.20  
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) was a 
response to a disciplinary breakdown in self-regulation in the auditing 
profession.21 Several features of the PCAOB are different from stock 
market self-regulation historically. 
The PCAOB, unlike the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), is more fully 
separate from the industry it regulates. Board members, for example, are 
selected by the SEC.22  
The PCAOB provides a single private regulator for the entire industry 
it regulates, not a stock-market-specific SRO like the NYSE.23 
The budget for the PCAOB is not directly susceptible to limitation by 
those the Board regulates, but instead is established by the Board subject 
to SEC approval.24 
The creation of the PCAOB occurred simultaneously with a 
restructuring of the standards applicable to auditors such as those that 
address conflicts of interest. Public accounting governance, in essence, 
 17. Id. at 468. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 469. 
 20. See generally Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law 
After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2002). 
 21. Id. at 477–82. 
 22. Id. at 483. 
 23. Id. at 482–84. 
 24. Id. at 489. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/8
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was adopted concomitant with the laws applicable to public accounting 
firms.25 
II. WHAT IS STATUTORY SELF-REGULATION? 
One of the most significant concepts in federal securities regulation is 
statutory securities of industry self-regulation.26 As articulated during the 
New Deal chairmanships of Landis, Douglas, and Frank, the necessity for 
self-regulation subject to SEC supervision stemmed primarily from two 
bases: first, the impracticality of direct SEC regulation of the several 
thousand broker-dealers and business corporations subject to its 
jurisdiction, and second, a preference for business, with its greater 
practical knowledge of its own affairs, to participate in the development 
and application of SEC rules and reduce the likelihood of unnecessary 
disruption or inefficiency.27 
Far from being a panacea, statutory self-regulation subject to SEC 
supervision generally has been effective in major applications only when 
the Commission has been willing to threaten or actually use its regulatory 
authority to create incentives for securities industry self-regulation.28  
As a 1973 report of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities aptly 
stated: 
 25. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 737–41 (Aspen Pub. 3d ed. 2003). 
 26. Id. at 439. 
 27. Id. at 439. See also Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 
50,700, 84 SEC Docket 619 (Nov. 18, 2004), 
 Self-regulation is a key component of U.S. securities industry regulation. All broker-
dealers are required to be members of a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), which sets 
standards, conducts examinations, and enforces rules regarding its members. Most, but not 
all, SROs also operate and regulate markets or clearing services. Inherent in self-regulation is 
the conflict of interest that exists when an organization both serves the commercial interests 
of and regulates its members or users. 
 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), the Maloney Act of 1938 
(“Maloney Act”), and the Exchange Act Amendments of 1975 (“1975 Amendments”), reflect 
Congress’ determination to rely on self-regulation as a fundamental component of U.S. 
market and broker-dealer regulation, despite this inherent conflict of interest. Congress 
favored self-regulation for a variety of reasons. A key reason was that the cost of effectively 
regulating the inner-workings of the securities industry at the federal level was viewed as cost 
prohibitive and inefficient. In addition, the complexity of securities trading practices made it 
desirable for SRO regulatory staff to be intimately involved with SRO rulemaking and 
enforcement. Moreover, the SROs could set standards that exceeded those imposed by the 
Commission, such as just and equitable principles of trade and detailed proscriptive business 
conduct standards. In short, Congress determined that the securities industry self-regulatory 
system would provide a workable balance between federal and industry regulation. 
Id. at 620 (footnotes omitted). But cf. id. at 623–48 (discussing current challenges facing SROs). 
 28. SELIGMAN, supra note 25, at 439–40. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The inherent limitations in allowing an industry to regulate itself are 
well known: the natural lack of enthusiasm for regulation on the 
part of the group to be regulated, the temptation to use a facade of 
industry regulation as a shield to ward off more meaningful 
regulation, the tendency for businessmen to use collective action to 
advance their interests through the imposition of purely 
anticompetitive restraints as opposed to those justified by regulatory 
needs, and a resistance to changes in the regulatory pattern because 
of vested economic interests in its preservation.29 
It is worth stressing that statutory self-regulation is a different concept 
than industry self-regulation. Under the federal securities laws, each self-
regulatory organization is subject to SEC oversight and minimum statutory 
and regulatory requirements. This is strikingly different from an industry 
regulating itself. 
The practical advantages of statutory self-regulation have long been 
viewed as outweighing the potential dysfunction caused by conflicts of 
interest. First implemented with stock markets in 1934,30 statutory self-
regulation has been extended to securities associations in 1938,31 securities 
account protection through the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
in 1970,32 municipal securities in 1975,33 public accountants (including 
both auditing-and accounting-standards-setting) in 2002,34 and, more 
recently, the National Futures Association was created for the limited 
purpose of regulating futures products registered with the SEC.35 
III. WHAT FORM OF STATUTORY SELF-REGULATION SHOULD APPLY TO 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES? 
There is no specialized SRO such as the PCAOB that currently applies 
to investment companies, although the NASD performs a limited role.36 A 
 29. Id. at 440 (quoting Securities Industry Study, Report of the S. Subcomm. on Securities, S. 
Doc. No. 93–13, 93d Congress, 1st Session (1973). p.145). 
 30. Seligman, supra note 2, at 1349-52. 
 31. Id. at 1352–54, 1361–62. 
 32. See 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3288-310 (3d ed. rev’d 
2003). 
 33. See 6 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3103.34-.42 (3d ed. rev’d 
2002). 
 34. See Seligman, supra note 20, at 482-99. Accounting-standard-setting had earlier been 
conducted by SROs such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board without detailed SEC statutory 
authority. See 2 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 733–51 (3d ed. rev’d 1999). 
 35. See National Futures Association, http://www.nfa.futures.org/aboutnfa/indexAbout.asp. 
 36. For example, the NASD requires its members to file investment company advertisements and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/8
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case can be made that the NASD’s limited supervision combined with 
SEC oversight is sufficient. Notably, SEC oversight of investment 
companies has been enhanced. Since 2002 the Commission has 
dramatically increased the size of the Division of Investment Management, 
Division of Enforcement, and Office of Compliance, Inspections, and 
Examination (OCIE);37 adopted or proposed several new Investment 
sales literature within ten days of first use in publication, see NASD Rule 2210(c) (CCH Nov. 2003), 
and generally oversees member sales practice with respect to investment companies.  
 The Commission had previously considered creating an investment advisers SRO. Then SEC 
Chair Richard Breeden testified in 1992: 
 Another proposal that has been made in the past would be to create an SRO in this area. 
That’s certainly a possibility. When the Commission proposed that a couple of years ago, 
there was a great deal of objection received from a number of groups in the public, and 
frankly, we believe it would be much more expensive than conducting examinations through 
the SEC. 
SEC Overnight of Investment Advisers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 26 (1992) (statement of Richard C. Breeden, 
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). An investment advisers SRO is different from 
the proposal in this article. 
 In 2003, Professor Mercer Bullard proposed a Mutual Fund Oversight Board in Congressional 
testimony. Mutual Funds: Who’s Looking out for Investors?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 157–58 (2003) 
(statement of Mercer E. Bullard, Founder and President, Fund Democracy, Inc.). 
 37. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 4, at 9, the GAO testified: 
 To address the mutual fund scandals, [the] SEC has plans to substantially increase the 
staffing in the units responsible for mutual fund oversight. As shown in table 1, between 2002 
and 2005, [the] SEC plans to increase the staffing for OCIE and the Division of Enforcement 
by 46 and 30 percent, respectively. [The] SEC also plans to increase the staffing within the 
Division of Investment Management by 16 percent. [The] SEC staff told us that many of the 
new personnel will be working on mutual fund issues. 
Table 1: Staff Positions for SEC Divisions and Offices with Responsibilities for 
Mutual Fund Regulation, Oversight, and Enforcement, at Fiscal Year End 
SEC Unit Actual 
2002 
Actual 
2003 
Estimated 
2004
Requested 
2005
Percent 
change 2002-
2005
Investment Management 
Divisiona 
173 167 190 200 16%
OCIEb 397 439 545 579 46
Enforcement Divisionc 980 1,016 1,248 1,278 30
Source: GAO analysis of SEC data. 
Notes: 
aIncludes staff in the office that administers the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 
bThe amounts for OCIE present only those staff in SEC’s headquarters and regional offices who support or conduct 
examinations of mutual funds and investment advisers. 
cThe amounts for the Division of Enforcement include all staff in SEC’s headquarters and regional that support or conduct 
enforcement activities over mutual funds, investment advisers, broker-dealers, and all other entities that SEC regulates. 
Id. 
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Company Act rules in response to the scandals;38 and brought a significant 
number of enforcement actions.39 
The question can fairly be put: Isn’t this enough? However quiescent 
the SEC may have been, the Commission learned from experience and 
now should be more than equal to the task. 
I am skeptical. The Commission’s ability to devote sufficient resources 
to investment company inspection and discipline has been, at best, a 
sometime thing. It is now apparently facing a new period of budget 
stringency. For the 2006 fiscal year, the Bush Administration has proposed 
 38. Among other initiatives, in 2004, the Commission adopted amendments to Forms N-1A, N-3, 
N-4, and N-6 to require mutual funds to disclose their policies with respect to frequent purchases and 
redemptions of fund shares. The Commission also adopted amendments to Forms N-1A and N-3 to 
require specified variable annuities to explain the circumstances and effects of any use of fair value 
pricing. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 
Securities Act Release No. 8408, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 82 SEC Docket 2357 
(Apr. 16, 2004); See also Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio 
Holdings, Securities Act Release No. 8343, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,287, 81 SEC 
Docket 2425 (Dec. 10, 2003) (proposal). 
 The Commission has also proposed a time limit on the purchase of redeemable fund shares to 
prevent the receipt of an order after the time that the fund establishes for the calculation of its net asset 
value to prevent unlawful late trading in fund shares. Amendments to Rules Governing Prices of 
Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,288, 81 SEC Docket 2553 (Dec. 11, 
2003). 
 In 2004 the Commission adopted several new Investment Company Act governance rules. 
Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 83 SEC Docket 
1384 (July 27, 2004). Collectively the rule amendments usually will require that covered funds have a 
board with at least seventy-five percent independent directors; an independent director be chair of the 
fund board; the board conduct an annual self-assessment; the independent directors meet at least once 
each quarter without any interested persons present; the independent directors be authorized to hire 
staff to help fulfill the board’s fiduciary duties; and that the board retain copies of written materials 
that directors consider in approving advisory companies under § 15 of the Investment Company Act. 
Id.; see also Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,323, 81 SEC 
Docket 3414 (Jan. 15, 2004) (proposal). Commissioners Atkins and Glassman dissented from the 
requirements that seventy-five percent of the board and the chairman be independent. Investment 
Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 83 SEC Docket 1384, 1402–07 
(July 27, 2004). 
 Subsequently the Commission also adopted two new rules and other rule amendments to require 
broker-dealers to provide their customers with point-of-sale information regarding the costs and 
conflicts of interests that arise from the distribution of mutual fund shares, unit investment trust 
interests, and municipal fund securities. Disclosure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, 
Securities Act Release No. 8427, Exchange Act Release No. 49,817, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,464, 82 SEC Docket 3441 (June 7, 2004). 
 SEC oversight of mutual funds was harshly criticized. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.’s Oversight of 
Mutual Funds Is Said to Be Lax, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at A1; Arthur Levitt, Jr. & Richard C. 
Breeden, Op-Ed, Our Ethical Erosion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at A16. 
 In response, the Commission has expanded its investigation of mutual fund sales practices, see 
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Has Found Payoffs in Sales of Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at 
A1, and brought the type of cases described above. See supra notes 6–7, 11, 13; Tom Lauricella & 
Christopher Oster, Why Your Mutual Fund’s Trading Matters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2004, at C1. 
 39. See sources cited supra notes 6–7, 11, 13. 
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a “flat” budget,40 which in real dollar terms, means a decline. There is little 
basis for optimism that the Commission’s budget will keep pace with its 
regulatory challenges if they increase or that Congress in the foreseeable 
future will approve self-funding for the Commission41 to avert the 
Commission’s periodic budget inadequacy. Under the circumstances, it is 
worth highlighting how reliant the SEC has been on SROs. Direct SEC 
regulation of stock markets, even during a period of dramatic budget 
expansion after Enron, was simply not feasible. In 2003, the NASD and 
the NYSE had a combined regulatory staff of 2650 and a regulatory 
budget of $642 million.42 The NASD and NYSE staff is significantly 
larger than the staff of the SEC Division of Market Regulation and the 
Commission’s Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations 
(OCIE). The Division of Market Regulation supervises all broker-dealers 
and registered representatives, all types of securities markets including 
stock, options and single stock futures, all clearing agencies, and the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.43 Most of OCIE’s responsibilities 
are also unrelated to investment companies. Unless Congress is willing to 
make what appears to be a manifold increase in the number of Division of 
Market Regulation and OCIE staffers, direct SEC regulation of the stock 
market appears to be a nonstarter. 
Compounding the inadequacy of the resources the Commission has 
long devoted to investment company oversight is the inevitability that 
investment company rulemaking will soon be far down the Commission’s 
priority list. Throughout much of the recent past, the Commission’s 
leadership in this area has been reactive, focusing particularly on the crisis 
of the day or ongoing enforcement actions. Investment company 
regulation is technical, not a field of expertise for the typical 
Commissioner, and, as a historical matter, rarely has seemed as urgent as 
 40. Bush Seeks Flat Budget for SEC, Requesting Just Over $888 Million, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 261 (Feb. 14, 2005). 
 41. See Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. 
REV. 233 (2004). 
 42. Laurie P. Cohen & Kate Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question: Can Wall Street Regulate 
Itself?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, at A1. In 2003, the Wall Street Journal reported that the NASD 
had a regulatory staff of 2100 and a regulatory budget $500 million; the NYSE a staff of 550 and a 
budget of $142 million. Id. 
 43. SEC website, Division of Market Regulation, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ 
mrabout.shtml. In 2002, the SEC staff allocation for the Division of Market Regulation and part of the 
OCIE was 465 positions; by 2004 it was anticipated to grow to 627. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON SEC’S SPENDING AND 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 5 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03969t.pdf (testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Committee on Government 
Reform, House of Representatives). With respect to OCIE, see supra note 37. 
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activities the SEC has treated as its core functions, such as the mandatory 
disclosure system, stock market and broker-dealer oversight, and 
enforcement. This is not to suggest that investment companies have been 
ignored—quite clearly they have not—but instead to suggest a more 
nuanced point. Focusing SEC attention on investment companies is more 
difficult than focusing the Commission’s attention on stock markets, 
precisely because no investment company SRO originates rule proposals 
or enforcement actions. 
To discuss seriously a new SRO for investment companies requires 
articulating a broad outline of how such an SRO would operate. 
Scope: I would urge that a proposed Investment Company SRO solely 
address investment companies registered with the Commission and not 
address unregistered investment companies or investment advisers.44 
Among other exclusions, this would mean that the new SRO would not 
address hedge funds required by the Commission to register under the 
Investment Advisers Act.45 
Function: As with the PCAOB, securities exchanges, and securities 
associations,46 the functions of an Investment Company SRO should 
include: 
• registration of covered investment companies; 
• the establishment of standards of practice; 
• inspection; 
• investigations and discipline; and 
• establishment of a budget and management of the SRO’s 
operations. 
The core SRO functions would be rulemaking, inspection, and 
discipline of investment companies. 
SRO Board Selection and Budget: There are two models that could be 
employed. The older stock-market-SRO model allows industry selection 
of a board, subject, assuming some form of Regulation SRO is adopted, to 
 44. In 2004, there were “approximately 8000 investment advisers registered with [the SEC, who] 
manage[d] more than $23 trillion in client assets.” Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain 
Hedge Funds Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 83 SEC Docket 1124, 1125 (July 
20, 2004). 
 45. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 84 SEC Docket 1032 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
 46. See Securities Exchange Act §§ 6(b), 15A(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78o-3(b) (2000); 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–19 (Supp. II 2002) (especially § 7211(a)). 
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requirements that the governing board be composed of a majority of 
independent directors and specified committees will be composed solely 
of independent directors. Adoption of a Regulation SRO also will require 
that a nominating committee, comprised solely of independent directors, 
nominate new directors.47 A stock-market-SRO budget is funded by its 
members. Historically, stock-market-SRO performance has been uneven,48 
principally because of the inherent conflict of interest implicit in an 
industry setting regulatory standards for itself. It is uncertain whether the 
SEC’s Regulation SRO will overcome this conflict. I believe there is some 
chance that it might if the Regulation SRO is adopted as proposed, and I 
believe that the Regulation SRO itself deserves a fair chance to succeed. 
The alternative is the PCAOB model, in which the SEC selects the 
Board’s members subject to overarching requirements that the Chair and a 
majority of the five-person Board not be public accountants and a minority 
of the Board be accountants.49 The SEC also approves the PCAOB’s 
budget.50 
In my view, the decision on how a new SRO should be governed is of 
less consequence than the basic decision of whether there should be a new 
SRO at all. I think there is a substantial case that a focused SRO able 
regularly to inspect and discipline investment companies and develop the 
types of rules that currently govern the NYSE and the NASD would be 
wise. The NASD should retain its basic oversight of broker-dealers, so 
there will be delicate boundary issues to address.51 Thus, the focus of the 
new SRO should be the investment company itself as distinct from those 
that sell investment company products (when the sales effort is separate). 
As painful as some of the recent scandals have been in the investment 
company world, they are of less moment than the breakdowns involving 
auditors that led to the PCAOB. I believe a case can be made for an SRO, 
like the NYSE or the NASD, with direct industry election of both 
independent and industry representatives. My enthusiasm for this approach 
is contingent upon Regulation SRO or similar standards being adopted and 
 47. See supra note 16. 
 48. See generally Seligman, supra note 2. 
 49. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 50. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 51. Alternatively, the NASD itself could be empowered to regulate investment companies. There 
are arguments that can be made in opposition to such an arrangement. A specialized SRO such as the 
PCAOB is better able to address issues particular to investment companies than an SRO with multiple 
missions. On the other hand, since many of the problems in the investment company industry have 
involved broker-dealer sales practices that the NASD already addresses, empowering the NASD to 
regulate investment companies might achieve economies of integration and scale and would avoid the 
time and expense of establishing a new SRO. 
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the investment company SRO not being subject to the threat of withdrawal 
of financial support that proved to be a key precipitant of the need for the 
PCAOB. As with the accounting industry, in which the trade association, 
the AICPA, has endured, I would assume that the investment company 
trade association, the Investment Company Institute, also would endure. 
CONCLUSION 
When one focuses on investment company accountability, one 
ultimately can pursue an internal or an external model or some 
combination of both. Professor Langevoort’s symposium article well 
describes the more limited role that investment company boards play in 
contrast to corporate boards and how much more robust market forces 
such as a market for corporate control are with respect to corporate 
boards.52 Indeed, some like Richard Phillips have gone further and 
suggested that shareholder voting and independent directors on investment 
company boards should be scrapped altogether.53 Each investment 
company could be viewed as a product, with only the mutual fund 
complex having a board. 
These type of considerations militate in favor of relying on external 
accountability mechanisms. As a practical matter, SEC and State Attorney 
General enforcement actions should be viewed as a residual mechanism. 
The real issue is how to prevent dysfunction from occurring in the first 
place. From this perspective a new SRO makes particular sense. It could 
augment investment company boards, help investment companies 
themselves receive more rulemaking attention from the SEC, and, most 
significantly, help avoid the type of scandals that recently have 
besmirched the reputations of so many mutual fund families. Would it be 
worth the cost? I suggest now is the time to study seriously that type of 
empirical question. 
 52. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: 
Derivatives Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1017 (2005). 
 53. Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation Under the Investment Company Act—A Reevaluation of 
the Corporate Paraphenalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 903 
(1982). 
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